JSF Stands For TFX

We have no ax to grind against the F-35 however we predicted long ago that the F-35 operational history will replicate that of Lockheed's previous generation jet fighter, the F-104 Starfighter. Not a stellar record to be sure. Also, F-35 unit costs are almost $176 million per copy, (not $70 million as claimed by Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office). The Pentagon has indeed repeated history, JSF does stand for TFX. 

This rather blunt assessment surfaces in April 2022. 

The Pentagon forgot the first rule of engineering; it's easy to make the new thing - work worse - than the thing it's supposed to replace.

From a historical perspective, and looking at actual historical combat data (combat data), the F-35 program should be restricted to non-kinetic air-to-air combat tasks. This would lower the buy for the F-35 and Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) also.

Why? 

Because impressive stealth aircraft exercises can never replicate certain specific things that happen in a real war. See here

"Asked by a reporter on Jan. 14 for his thoughts about the F-35, then-Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller referred to his department’s largest weapon system program as a “piece of shit.”"

Source

02-Jun, 2021: "US Air Force wish list includes more F-15EX jets but no F-35s" Source

19-May 2021: The USAF starts to back-pedal on F-35 electronic capability. See here.

23-Jan 2021: Former acting US Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller describes the F-35 as, and we quote: "a piece of ..s**t." Existing F-35 operating costs $44,000 per flight hour. The program is in a tailspin. The USAF is moving to purchase new F-16s instead - as well as the F-15EX. Both are proven platforms.

08-Oct 2020: More program problems found after a crash. F-35 cost is over $175 million per copy.

29-Apr 2020: Acting [U.S.] Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan described the F-35 stealth fighter as “f---ed up”

24- June 2020: "F-35 is currently unable to fly in thunderstorms after the discovery of damage to one of the systems it uses to protect itself from lightning," Source

11-June 2019: The proverbial nail in the coffin for the F-35 program has come to light. The aircraft can only go supersonic in short bursts due to thermal overstress issues that burn the rear of the aircraft. 

The Pentagon and the MIC have yet again done what they do best - squander trillions of US tax dollars on junk and poor execution. It appears that the F-35 will indeed emulate the F-111 of the USAF and only retain any real ability as a strike platform. But as a multi-service-branch program - the F-35 is already dead.

For the record, we have never had an axe to grind against the F-35 program, the aircraft is rather a boring topic, to be honest. As long as per-unit acquisition and maintenance costs were kept near the General Dynamics F-16 and that the F-35 could be a robust, tough, combat aircraft - and not some hanger queen. However basic issues for the F-35 seem unending?

It is all too easy to watch stealth fighter proponents stumble over their own hyperbole. If stealth fighters are force multipliers - then by [their own] definition we do not need very many of them. This is surely what happened to the F-22A. Stealth fighter proponents are about to repeat their myopic exaggerations for the F-35. So be it. Then purchasing any more is unnecessary. We agree.

16-July 2019: Readiness issues continue to plague US F-35 and F-22 fleets.

11-Oct 2018: Worldwide F-35 fleet is grounded after an unexplained crash back in September. The aircraft that crashed had what was described "fuel tube" problem. There is also a troubling GOA report that could capture F-35 and other deeply computerized/coded platforms.

26-Jan 2018: Now a series of engine fires have been plaguing the F-35 program.

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In the late 1950s, the USAF Tactical Air Command (TAC) began looking for a replacement for its North American F-100 'Super Sabre', McDonnell F-101 'Voodoo' and Republic F-105 'Thunderchief' fighter-bombers. In early 1958, the U.S. Air Force issued General Operational Requirement (GOR) number 169, for an all-weather fighter, that was Mach 2 + capable, with reduced take-off and landing distance.

At the same time, the Navy was seeking a two-seat fleet defense fighter to replace their McDonnell Douglas F-4 'Phantom II' and Vought F-8 'Crusader' fighters.

In the early 1960s, DoD leadership was determined to reduce cost and complexity by producing a standardized aircraft that would be suitable for both the US Navy and the USAF. The new program was called TFX the joint Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX).

In June 1961 then defense secretary, McNamara ordered the US Air Force and the Navy to work together on TFX development.

The Navy wanted a plane equipped with a long-range search-track radar for air-to-air interception. The Air Force needed a terrain-following radar for low-level all-weather penetration. The USAF wanted a 34-ton full load while the Navy wanted a maximum weight of 23 tons.

The Pentagon launched the TFX program in September 1961, with the USAF as prime contractor. In early 1962 the TFX had been whittled down to two competitors: The Boeing '818' and General Dynamics/Grumman F-111. Secretary McNamara announced in November 1962 that General Dynamics/Grumman design had been selected. He ordered eighteen F-111As from General Dynamics for the USAF along with five F- 111Bs from Grumman for the USN - so testing could begin on both variants.

The TFX would incorporate new technologies including; solid-state avionics, new (turbofan) engines, and a new hallmark feature - variable geometry wings - to enhance maneuverability, and reduce take-off distances and landing speeds. TFX even had an internal weapons bay.

The F-111B was shorter than the F-111A, but its wingspan was increased (to increase wing area) to improve low-speed handling. The Navy F-111B would incorporate the Hughes AN/AWG-9 pulse-Doppler radar and six Hughes Phoenix air-to-air missiles while the USAF F-111A would have the General Electric AN/APQ-113 and Texas Instruments AN/APQ-110 terrain-following radar, with air-to-ground missiles.

Among a myriad of development issues, the F-35 has a problem with excessive internal weapon bay temperatures at high speed(s) and low altitudes and in ground temperatures exceeding 32°C (90°F). The aircraft is restricted to time limits at 500 to 600 knots when under 7620 m (25,000 ft). The F-35 as of yet has no (no) plan to enable internal carriage of an AIM-9 class weapon. 

While USAF development proceeded - serious problems with the Navy’s F-111B were surfacing. The Navy plane was underpowered, prone to engine compressor stall, had poor pilot visibility during carrier recovery and was grossly overweight. A radical weight-reduction program was undertaken by the Navy to try and address the weight issue. The changes made to lighten the Navy's F-111B only altered the design further and further away from platform standardization with F-111A – and in the end, the Navy plane remained still too heavy for carrier operations.

By early 1968 the writing was on the wall - the Navy canceled the F-111B in favor of a new dedicated purpose-designed aircraft for its fleet defense requirement. The new dedicated design would become the first in a series of new American super-fighters, the Grumman F-14 Tomcat.

The F-111A would be successful at its low-level penetration mission for the USAF. The Strategic Air Command even developed an FB-111 with increased range.

In the end - it is purpose-built aircraft that cost less over time. They work better - because they can do the mission tasked to them – better – and therefore longer - and therefore cheaper. The DoD would do well to learn from its own history.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has too much internal inertia inside the defense establishment to be canceled – though at this point - it should be. It is far too expensive per copy and will only do one of the missions being asked of it – tactical precision strike.

Because of the inherent FOD (Foreign Object Ingestion) threat during V/STOL and its vulnerability to ground fire - the Marines F-35B and CAS (Close Air Support) mission for the F-35 - is simply hopeless. It can fly in and drop a bomb...but at a cost of $500 billion to $1.5 trillion dollar program? The F-35 cannot be launched in a tailwind of probably around 20 knots. 

Like the F-14 that leveraged other technologies from the F-111B program – namely the Hughes AN/AWG-9 pulse-Doppler radar/Phoenix missile system - the public and our international partners would be far better served by adapting F-35 radar, sensor, and network technologies to our existing generation manned fighters.

[Above] Looking at the front of the F-35 is revealing - in that pilot rear visibility is poor. This is a distinct disadvantage in combat (although the Distributed Aperture System, called "DAS" claims to mitigate this issue to some degree, - we remain skeptical). Please note the two (2) heated 'pitot tubes' extend out, on either side of the aircraft chin. 

How these protuberances modulate F-35 RCS is unknown. Because the 'pitot tubes' must be electrically heated to work, they can appear as two (2) hot spots to an adversary's FLIR/IRST.

[Below] Examples of two of the most outstanding American military aircraft ever built. The superlative General Dynamics F-16 fighter (foreground) and the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II anti-tank/CAS aircraft (background). Both were "Fighter Mafia" inspired and driven designs. Other than excellent pilot visibility - the two have no similarities in layout or wing shape. These differences are a function of the different missions they designed to perform. The DoD has simply forgotten the lessons of the 1960s and 70s and reverted back to a 'one-size-fits-all' false concept. The F-35 is the modern expression of this false concept. The JSF program is both too big and too expensive.

The F-35 has had a host of engine fires that are going to plague all F-35 operators. We have warned repeatedly here, that the DoD should not buy Lockheed-designed jet fighters. Simulations of F-35s armed with Meteor missiles downing Flankers with no Lockheed losses are also hopelessly fantastic given IFF/ fratricide issues/risks. All these simulations ignore necessary friendly radar-telemetry transmission cycles for the missile in flight – after launch - to update target information - that can be detected by an advisory and countered before your missile arrives. New RWR will negate LPI schemes.  The AIM-120 C8 "D" also appears to be in for a bumpy ride of requalification attempts.

If we were honest, do you really want to put our aircrews in an F-35 over a Su-35?

I think we all know the answer to that question.

[Below] The US Navy Northrop Grumman X-47B (UCAS-D) program is proceeding (and rather smoothly we would add). The X-47 program to date has demonstrated some remarkable autonomous/semi-autonomous capability. While not a replacement for manned aircraft, the X-47 should be able to do the high-threat-environment precision-strike mission for the Navy and relegate F-35C as 'not-very-helpful' in that role, calling seriously into question the need for an F-35C at all. 

Allowing DoD to continue to exhaust impossible sums of money on the F-35 at this point - is frankly inexcusable. Had F-35 remain under $70 million per copy - perhaps - but not anymore. We think the Navy has got a winner here in the X-47B. The Secretary of Defense should pay closer attention to X-47B and seriously rethink (cancel) the F-35 program.

To cover F-35 cancellation: All F-35 radar, sensor, network technologies should be incorporated into existing platforms across all service branches. Transfer one-third of the USAF fleet of A-10 Thunderbolt IIs CAS/Anti-armor aircraft to US Marine Corps Aviation. The Marines can soldier on with the AV-8B for V/STOL fixed-wing. Transfer the entire remaining A-10 fleet to US Army Aviation (the USAF hates the CAS mission anyway). The USAF can leverage the Navy X-47B program for tactical high-threat precision-strike and SAM suppression; otherwise, it still has F-22A, B-1, B-2, F-15E, and F-16, and B-52 w/cruise missiles. The US Navy will reevaluate the F-18 Super Hornet “international” variant or a Super F-14 Tomcat 21 for a resurgent Mach 2+ fleet-defense need. A mission the F-35 could never do anyway. [Frankly, the DoD should build the Su-33 for the US Navy under license with U.S.engines, avionics, and radar.]

Since the time of our original writing, according to published sources, the X-47B has been demoted to "short-range air tanker and limited reconnaissance platform." Why the Navy wants to use taxpayer dollars for UCAV-stealth in this manner - remains perplexing. Stealthy platforms become very unstealthy as soon as they engage in in-flight refueling with deployed fuel-transfer receptacles and open doors.

The operational history, and in particular the air-combat history of Lockheed jet fighters since the 1950s will likely be the best indicator of how the F-35 will perform.

Your thoughts?

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