Russian Tactical Adaption : Russo-Ukrainian War

Editors note: Unwanted advertising popups are now the default on Google Blogger. The Boresight highly recommends installing free Adblock Plus into your browser to suppress this annoyance - and view our content in peace.

"...Along with the successful interception of most high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) [AGM-88] fired by Ukrainian aircraft, the Russian air defence network is now assessed to be achieving a significant number of intercepts against GMLRS munitions" [HIMARS].

- Dr. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds (May 2023) Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies. London.

The same day (19 May 2023) the United States greenlights NATO to send F-16AM fast-jets to Ukraine, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies in the United Kingdom, issues yet another extraordinary report. This time on Russian Tactical Adaption in the Russo-Ukrainian War. 

[Above] Royal Danish Air Force F-16AM. How NATO F-16 aircraft would operate from dispersed locations (read: operating from roadways) while also being overmatched by Russian R-37M - all remains unclear. The F-16 is an exceedingly capable machine - but after reading this latest RUSI report - it is difficult to see a role for the F-16 in Ukraine.

This latest RUSI report contains some frankly astonishing details. 

Original link: 

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine 

Here are some excerpts from the RUSI report:

"The efficiency of Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) against the Ukrainian Air Force has also remained significant. The longest-known shoot-down against Ukrainian aircraft was at 150 km when the aircraft was flying lower than 50 feet. This appears to have been cued by a 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar with the air defence missile achieving a post-apex lock on the target."

48Ya6-K1 “Podlet K1” (Cyrillic: 48Я6-К1 «Подлет-К1»; translated: “Approach”) is a mobile three-coordinate S-Band phased-array antenna low-altitude radar. The bottom back-to-back arrays are secondary radar, the thin array for international standard (SIF Mark Ⅻ STD NATO) IFF, and the larger for national Russian IFF. The narrow antenna next to the large array is a compensation antenna for protection against jamming (ECCM). 

"The strength of the air defence network is bolstered by persistent combat air patrols at medium altitudes by Russian Su-35Ss. Using R-37 missiles, these aircraft pose a significant threat at very long range. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the longest-range recorded kill by a Russian R-37 was at 177 km." 

[Above/Below] Sukhoi Su-35S 'Flanker-E' of the VKS. The aircraft features the superb N035 Irbis-E radar that can pick up opposing aircraft at long range, even if the opposing aircraft fly at very low altitudes - in clutter - and engage them with R-77-1 and R-37M. 

The precise number of Ukrainian aircraft shot down by VKS Flankers is unclear. The new extended-range R-77-1 (shown here) has a published range of ~ 110 km (59 nautical miles). The range of the ultra-long-range Russian R-37M (NATO: AA-13 'Axehead') air-to-air missile is almost 400 km (215 nautical miles). This outranges anything in NATO inventories by some 190 km (100 nautical miles).

[Above] New image of VKS Su-35S fitted for CAP over Ukraine. 2x R-37Ms (centerline), 2x R-77-1 (stations 3 & 4), 2x R-73L (stations 5 & 6), 1x Kh-31PM (station 12) and L265M10P (station 8) L265M10R (station 7) respectively. Auxiliary drop tanks are never used on Flanker. 

Kh-31 'Krypton' anti-radiation missile being fitted to the port-wing station on this Su-35S. Each engine nacelle has R-77-1 and the outboard wing stations are fitted with R-73L 'Archer' IR dogfight missiles. 

[Above/Below] Vympel R-37M (NATO reporting name: AA-13 "Axehead") was a surprise to Western observers. The weapon has a published range of almost 400 km (215 nautical miles). Designed to engage fighters, attack aircraft, bombers, transport, air tankers, ISR, AWACS, helicopters, and cruise missiles - in all weather day/night, from any aspect, in an ECM/ECCM environment, where targets can be in clutter over land or water. This includes multi-channel ripple firing (different missiles in the air at the same time flying to different targets). Think of the US-Navy F-14 'Tomcat' and AIM-54 Phoneix missile combo.

Too many Western analysts assured everyone that Russia had no more money to develop any new weapon systems due to corruption. The appearance, fielding and heavy employment of both R-37M and R-77-1 prove these voices wrong. Best to ignore them moving forward.

These two R-37Ms have been fitted to the centerline of this Su-35S aircraft between the engine nacelles. This view is from the tail end of the weapon(s).

"Although separate from the air defence system, the combination of threat from long-range ground-based anti-air capabilities, medium-altitude look-down radar, long-range air-to-air missiles, and effective point defence systems makes the air combat environment extremely lethal. For this reason, most Ukrainian fast air and attack aviation engagements utilize S-7 rockets, fired in a lofted profile from above Ukrainian positions."

"Russian air defences have become significantly more robust since the autumn of 2022. Complexes of SA-21 and SA-23 are now stationed around key logistical and C2 hubs. Critically, they appear to have SA-15 and SA-22 connected to their fire control radars, significantly improving the situational awareness and track data quality of these short-range air defence (SHORAD) systems. This has had two principal effects. First, the long-range radar, combined with systems such as the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar, have proven highly effective in denying airspace to Ukrainian aviation. Second, Russian SHORAD [Short-range air defence] systems have massively improved their point defence efficiency."

Tor-E2. This system is part of Russian SHORAD (Short-range air defence).

"Along with the successful interception of most high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) [AGM-88] fired by Ukrainian aircraft, the Russian air defence network is now assessed to be achieving a significant number of intercepts against GMLRS munitions" [HIMARS]

[Above/Below] Raytheon AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM).  Length  4.92 m (16 ft 16 in), Diameter 25.4 cm (10 in).

US-supplied AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile on a starboard wing station of this UkrAF MiG-29. Integration was not as difficult as imagined as the MiG's fire-control/avionics designated the US weapon as an anti-radiation version R-27EP AA-10 'Alamo-F'.

[Below] Lockheed Martin M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) employs the GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) M30/M31 rockets. Each rocket M30/M31 Length  3.94 m (12 ft 11 in) Diameter  22.7 cm (8.94 in).

Not only are US-supplied GMLRS munitions having their GPS guidance jammed by Russian EW - we now learn what we suspected for a while - that US-supplied weapons are actually being shot down 'in flight' by Russian AD before reaching their targets.

The first compelling evidence that Russian AD might indeed be intercepting incoming Ukrainian rocket fire appeared on 20 July 2022. See here.

So the obvious first-order questions would be: 

• What is the frontal-aspect RCS (Radar Cross Section) of the AGM-88?
• What is the frontal-aspect RCS (Radar Cross Section) of the M30/M31 HIMARS rocket?
• What is the frontal-aspect RCS (Radar Cross Section) of the ATACMS HIMARS rocket?

"The Shipovnik-Aero is proving a particularly effective system because it has a low signature and can further obfuscate this by imitating other emitters and communications devices [DRFM]. It also has a sophisticated range of effects for downing UAVs.The Russian military is also continuing to make extensive use of navigational interference in the battle area as a form of electronic protection. This is contributing to a Ukrainian loss rate in UAVs of approximately 10,000 per month"

Shipovnik-Aero. The system uses DRFM to listen and spoof all manner of EM band transmissions pings, squawks, and comms.

"Alongside large systems such as the Shipovnik-Aero, the Russian military has been extensively rolling out EW effectors to be organic to units at all echelons. This includes counter-UAS capabilities assigned to each platoon,59 which usually include directional jammers and arrays for hijacking UAVs." 

"Another function of Russian EW troops is interception and decryption of Ukrainian military communications. The Russian military is proving highly capable in this area. Ukrainian officers recalled one incident in which the Russian headquarters gave pre-emptive warning to its units of an artillery strike based on Ukrainian troops calling in a fire mission. The Ukrainian troops were communicating with Motorola radios with 256-bit encryption, but it appeared that the Russians were able to capture and decrypt these transmissions in near real time. The most likely system for such functions is the Torn-MDM. When the Russians are not intercepting traffic, Ukrainian units note that they are reliably able to suppress the receivers on Motorola radios out to approximately 10 km beyond the FLET."

"Another EW function in the counter-UAS fight is deception measures that generate a large number of fake UAVs on enemy systems and replicate ground control stations. While the Russian military is yet to widely exploit the creation of a large number of false targets, it has the capability to do so – and these actions are growing more prevalent."

Torn-SIGINT MDM

"One important development is that the Russians have made several modifications to their tanks that are reducing the effectiveness of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). First, they are fitting vehicles – as well as many defensive positions – with anti-thermal material, which is proving highly effective." 

"Nakidka" thermal masking material

"Second, modification to the engine deck and thus the heat plume from the vehicle’s exhaust and engine is reducing the reliability of where certain ATGMs engage the target. Third, by fighting at dusk and dawn when the vehicle temperature is most similar to the ambient temperature of the surroundings (known as ‘thermal crossover’), the vehicles are harder to detect through thermal imagery. The result is a significant decrease in the probability of kill from several ATGM types, although this is only achievable by imposing a range of tactical constraints on the employment of Russian armour."

"The use of older tanks as assault guns in this role appears to be preferred as the urban environment does not give more modern Russian tanks with advanced optics and multispectral concealment a sufficient tactical advantage to justify their loss. Of course, as tanks are drawn into urban areas for this purpose, they also risk coming into direct contact with enemy armour, with armoured clashes sometimes taking place from distances as close as 50 m"

"Tank-on-tank engagements have become relatively rare, but when they occur they usually take place within 1,000 m. Engagement speed has been the determining factor in these clashes. Ukrainian tankers note that one-shot kills are possible if the point between the turret and glacis is hit. Russian explosive reactive armour (ERA), however, has proven highly effective, preventing most anti-tank systems from defeating the tank’s armour. Some operators have reported hitting tanks multiple times with barrel-launched ATGMs without knocking them out."

"...the introduction of older tanks such as the T62 and T55 to the field has been mocked online, these vehicles are largely being used in the role of the fire support function offered by BMPs and other infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)."

T-62MV

T-55

"They represent an increase in range, protection and kinetic effect over these IFVs, and therefore pose a serious battlefield threat when there are a limited number of anti-tank guided weapons able to reach them at their stand-off range."

A recent July 23, 2023, article in the New York Times only makes the situation even dire for Ukraine. The article details how Ukraine-NATO can not deal with the Russian Lancnt attack drone. They don't even know how it communicates ( link w/out paywall).

The Lancet-3 and Lancet-3M loitering-munition drones have proven highly effective in Ukraine - and it came as a nasty shock. So much so that they almost deserve their own writing. Lancet can be used for both reconnaissance and attack. As of July 2023, US-NATO-Ukriane cannot determine how it communicates so Lancet is impossible to jam. The Russians are migrating away from reliance on a WW2-type heavy fire doctrine (barrel wear) to one of greater precision with a lesser volume of fires. Lancent was first unveiled in 2019, and so now part of this transition.  

The situation may be starting to sink in for some in the West.

On 5/524 this excellent analysis appeared. 

Editors Note: Since the time of our original writing Ukraine claimed on 25-Dec 2023 it shot down five (5) Russian Su-34s fighter-bombers, and one Su-30 fighter over 3 days. Then on 15-Jan 2024 Ukraine claimed it downed a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft. 

We can find absolutely no evidence for these claims. No corroborating image(s) of wreckage from any source. Nothing. Zero. We could only find evidence that one (1) Su-34 Fullback might be down and an IL-22 was damaged - but landed safely. Friendly fire is (far) more likely.

Works Cited

“AGM-88 HARM.” Air Force, www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104574/agm-88-harm/.

“Air Defense Missile System “Tor-E2” | Catalog Rosoboronexport.” Roe.ru, Rosoboronexport, 2023, roe.ru/eng/catalog/air-defence-systems/air-defense-systems-and-mounts/%22Tor-E2%22/. Accessed 24 May 2023.

“Automated 3D Low-Altitude Omnidirectional Radar “Podlet-E” (48YA6-K1E) | Catalog Rosoboronexport.” Roe.ru, 2023 Rosoboronexport, 2023, roe.ru/eng/catalog/air-defence-systems/radar-and-electro-optical-equipment-for-air-target-detection/%22Podlet-E%22%20%2848YA6-K1E%29/. Accessed 24 May 2023.

“High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) — M142.” USAASC, asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/ms-himars-m142/.

“Kontakt-V Explosive Reactive Armour Provides Effective Protection against Modern Anti-Tank Missiles 32503162 | Weapons Defence Industry Military Technology UK | Analysis Focus Army Defence Military Industry Army.” Www.armyrecognition.com, www.armyrecognition.com/weapons_defence_industry_military_technology_uk/kontakt-v_explosive_reactive_armour_provides_effective_protection_against_modern_anti-tank_missiles_32503162.html. Accessed 24 May 2023.

“Ominous Warning: Russian Air Power in Ukraine.” Ominous Warning, theboresight.blogspot.com/2022/11/ominous-warning-russian-air-power-in.html.

“R-37 Long-Range Aircraft Missile (RVV-BD) | Missilery.info.” En.missilery.info, en.missilery.info/missile/r37. Accessed 27 May 2023.

“Russia Has Deployed T-62M and T-62MV Tanks to the Border with Ukraine.” Militarnyi, mil.in.ua/en/news/russia-has-deployed-t-62m-and-t-62mv-tanks-to-the-border-with-ukraine/. Accessed 24 May 2023.

“Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive.” Royal United ServicesInstitutemenuplussearchclockpdfprintfacebooktwitterlinkedinemailprintfacebooktwitteryoutubelinkedinrss, 4 Sept. 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/stormbreak-fighting-through-russian-defences-ukraines-2023-offensive.

Seligman, Lara. ““Big Step”: U.S. Joins Major Effort to Train Ukrainian Pilots on F-16s, Other Jets.” POLITICO, 19 May 2023, www.politico.com/news/2023/05/19/fighter-jets-ukraine-biden-00097846?2. Accessed 24 May 2023.

“The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence.” Royal United Services Institutemenuplussearchsearchclockpdfprintfacebooktwitterlinkedinemailprintfacebooktwitteryoutubelinkedinrss, 7 Nov. 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence.

“UAV Interception System Was Shown at Army-2016 Forum - RUSSIAN AVIATION.” Www.ruaviation.com, www.ruaviation.com/news/2016/9/13/6857/?h. Accessed 24 May 2023.

Watling, Dr Jack, and Nick Reynolds. “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine.” Www.rusi.orghttps, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 19 May 2023, www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine. Accessed 24 May 2023.

- All media found here is for scholarly and research purposes and protected under U.S. Internet ‘Fair Use’ Law -